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Supporting the “Grand Illusion” of Direct Perception: Implicit 
Learning in Eye-Movement Control
Frank H. Durgin
Part of the “Grand Illusion” of complete and direct perception is the transparency 
of our eye-movements. We simply don’t notice them. The visual information from 
the retina that supports visual consciousness is sampled discontinuously in the brief 
fixations that normally occur two or three times per second. Our eyes make abrupt 
movements called saccades nearly every second of our waking lives. These eye 
“jumps” connect the individual fixations we make, gathering visual information that 
underlies our actions and our perceptual experience.
Although often crucial to the successful recovery of visual information in which we 
are consciously interested, our eye movements are, by and large, unconscious actions. 
They may be said to represent an aspect of the information-gathering control struc­
tures postulated by Gibson (1966), though they are not, themselves, part of our 
awareness. Given the importance of eye-movements for the retrieval of visual infor­
mation from the enviromnent, the question arises whether the eye-movement control 
system is capable of implicit learning, or learning without awareness. The present 
studies were undertaken to investigate this possibility. Can eye-movement patterns 
show learned sensitivity to environmental regularities of which we are not con­
sciously aware?
In part, the motivation of these studies derived from evidence that visual con­
sciousness often goes beyond the information available to visual cognition. For 
example, a visual texture can appear to be seen in clear detail—each element clearly 
represented. Yet studies of texture adaptation (e.g., Durgin and Proffitt 1996) indi­
cate that our perceptual experience is based on processes of “biological image com­
pression.” This means that the amount of information actually available in cognition 
is vastly less than would be required to completely specify the detail that seems to us 
to be evident in our conscious experience. Similarly, recent interest in short-term 
perceptual memory has been fueled by the apparent discrepancy between the amount 
of information that seems to be present in consciousness and our insensitivity to fairly 
large alterations in the content of our environment from moment to moment (e.g.. 
Grimes 1996, Rensink et al. 1997). In what ways might the sophisticated control of 
eye-movements help to support the “Grand Illusion” of complete perception?
Part of the motivation for this research came from the literatures on implicit 
learning (cf. Berry and Dienes 1993, Reber 1993, for reviews). If we are not really 
“seeing” all that we think we are seeing, might there nonetheless be (unconscious) 
information available to guide the visual-information-acquisition systems? Might not 
the whole nature of visual-information acquisition actually involve fairly compli­
cated, yet unconscious, smart routines for guiding the control of eye-movements.
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To test this idea, I have developed a paradigm for examining whether eye- 
movement patterns during a visual search task can be modified in response to hid­
den contingencies. Because of the phenomenon of change blindness, it is possible to 
surreptitiously introduce a target into a search display mid-trial, during a saccadic 
eye movement, so that it appears directly in the line of gaze at the termination of 
the saccade. From the participant’s point of view, the target is simply found on the 
screen. From the experimenter’s point of view, the introduction of the target can be 
made contingent on particular patterns of eye-movement. In a series of preliminary 
studies, I found that I could make participants produce larger saccades sooner, if I 
surreptitiously made target appearance in a visual search task contingent (probabil­
istically) on large eye movements. That is, in time-limited search trials, success rate at 
“finding” (eliciting) the target was found to increase over the first 60 trials, and this 
was related primarily to a decreasing latency for making a large eye-movement 
during a trial. Eye-movement patterns for controls did not change with time.
The goal of the present investigations was to look at somewhat more complex rules 
for target elicitation. Specifically, in each of the two experiments to be presented here, 
an attempt is made to promote either clockwise or counter-clockwise search patterns 
in a dense display. In Experiment 1, the rules for the clockwise and counterclockwise 
groups were defined with respect to successive saccade directions. If the change in 
direction between two saccades made a turn to the right, the clockwise rule was sat­
isfied; if it made a turn to the left, it counted as a counterclockwise. In Experiment 2, 
the rules for the clockwise and counterclockwise search groups were defined with 
respect to the screen (i.e., on the right side of the screen a downward saccade would 
be clockwise, whereas on the left of the screen, an upward saccade would be clock­
wise). These rules are schematically illustrated in figure 16.1. Intriguingly, implicit 
learning will be demonstrated in Experiment 1, but not in Experiment 2. Conversely, 
in Experiment 2 several participants become explicitly aware of a successful search 
strategy for finding the target, whereas none did in Experiment 1. These findings 
suggest that implicit learning in eye-movement control systems may be limited to 
variables associated with the coding of saccades in eye-centered polar coordinates, 
rather than in world (or display) coordinates, whereas conscious strategies are best 
developed for world- or display-relative coordinate systems.
Experiment 1
The general form both of the experiments to be presented here is that participants 
will perform a visual search task in which the “discovery” of a target actually
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Figure 16.1
Rule definitions for experiments 1 and 2. Panels A and B illustrate “clockwise” and “counterclockwise” 
saccadic trajectories which could elicit a target in experiment 1. Panels C and D illustrate “clockwise” and 
“counterclockwise” saccadic trajectories which could elicit a target in experiment 2. Both kinds of rule were 
intended to foster clockwise or counterclockwise search patterns, but implicit learning was only found with 
the rules from experiment 1.
depends on first eliciting the target by means of some simple rule concerning the eye- 
movements of the participants. Preliminary studies had shown improved performance 
when the rule involved a contingency on saccade velocity (i.e., distance) during search. 
The present experiment was designed to test whether two different rules could be learned 
by participants. One rule was intended to promote clockwise search patterns around 
the screen, the other was intended to promote counterclockwise search patterns.
If implicit learning of these rules occurs and the learning is specific to the rules, 
then two patterns of results ought to emerge. First, task performance should improve 
across trials. Second, analysis of saccade patterns ought to demonstrate differential 
frequencies of clockwise and counterclockwise saccades for the two rule groups.
Methods
Participants. The participants were 20 Swarthmore undergraduates who were paid 
for their participation.
Apparatus. The displays were controlled by a Macintosh PowerPC 7600 and pre­
sented on a ViewSonic 17 RGB monitor with a resolution of 1152 x 870 pixels. 
Vertical refresh was 75 Hz. The display was viewed from a distance of about 0.5 m 
without head restraint. An SRR Eyelink® which uses head-mounted 250 Hz infrared 
video and head movement compensation to sample gaze position at 4 ms intervals 
monitored eye position. Physical updating of the display could be accomplished 
within a single video frame (13.3 ms), for a total lag of less than 18 ms. Gaze accu­
racy was normally well within 0.5 degrees, and the display-center gaze position was 
recalibrated at the beginning of each trial to avoid systematic drift.
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Design. Each participant performed visual search in 150 trials. Participants were 
randomly assigned to either the clockwise rule condition (N = 9) or the counter­
clockwise rule condition (N = 11).
Displays. Search displays were composed of 800 randomly scattered, nonover­
lapping line segments (approx. 2 x 24 min of arc), appearing, with equal frequency, 
in red, green, blue, yellow and in each of 4 orientations (0, 45, 90 135 deg) against a 
black background. The target was a red “X” composed of two diagonal lines, (which 
was not initially present on experimental trials).
Rule for target elicitation. The implicit rules for target elicitation were intended 
to foster either clockwise or counterclockwise search patterns around the screen by 
rewarding pairs of saccades that constituted either a right-hand turn or a left-hand 
turn, respectively. In essence, any large saccade (reaching a velocity of at least 300 
deg/sec over an 8 ms period) was treated as the first leg of a turn and immediately 
subsequent saccades were compared in direction with the first leg. Any turn between 
45 and 135 deg was considered clockwise, and turns of 225 to 315 deg were consid­
ered counterclockwise. Target elicitation was thereafter guaranteed provided that a 
candidate target location was available within a deg of final fixation. Since saccadic 
movements can be detected and their direction well characterized by triplets of suc­
cessive gaze samples (4 ms apart) which show large absolute changes in position, 
satisfaction of the direction-change rule could be computed during the second sac- 
cade. A target could then be placed near the anticipated landing point of the saccade 
provided two further conditions were met. Namely, a target could only appear in a 
location previously occupied by one of the red elements on the screen, and, to avoid 
detection of the deception, targets could not appear in a location within 2 degrees of 
any previous fixation position. If no appropriate location was available, target elic­
itation was delayed until some further set of saccades satisfied the rule.
The ostensible task. Participants were told that they were in a study of eye- 
movements during visual search. This served as a cover story for the use of the head- 
mounted eye tracker. Their task was to find a red “X” on the screen if one was 
present and to press a button as soon as they found it. They began each trial fixating 
a spot in the center of the screen and pressing a key which triggered the start of the 
trial 500 msec later. Trials were always terminated when the response button was 
pressed or, if no button was pressed, after 3 seconds.
Assessment of awareness. All participants were interviewed at the conclusion of the 
experiment. Several believed that the target was not always present from the begin­
ning, but none believed that target appearance was in any way connected with their 
search strategy or eye-movements. Only one student mentioned a correlative strategy
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of examining the comers of the display first (though he did not indicate that he had 
swept the comers in any particular direction). The results discussed below are 
unchanged when this student’s data are dropped from the analysis.
Analysis of learning. Because learning curves are often decelerating functions, the 
analysis of learning was conducted over geometrically increasing numbers of trials. 
Specifically, the 150 trials were broken into an initial block of ten, subsequent blocks 
of twenty and forty trials, and a final block of eighty trials. (Analyses by blocks 
composed of equal number of trials came to equivalent conclusions.) The dependent 
measure used to assess improvement over time is simply the rate of search success 
(number of successful searches divided by the number of trials in each block).
Results and Discussion
In order to assess whether participants improved at the task, a repeated measures 
ANOVA of rate of success at the search task as a function of Trial Block (4 blocks) 
was conducted with a between-groups factor of Rule Direction (clockwise or counter­
clockwise). As anticipated, success rate differed reliably as a function of Trial Block, 
F(3,54) = 8.48, p < .001. More specifically, planned comparisons showed that the 
mean success rate in the third and fourth blocks (43% and 46%, respectively) reliably 
exceeded that in the first block (26%), t(19) = 3.25, p < .01, t(19) = 4.40, p < .01. The 
mean success rate in the fourth block also reliably exceeded that in the second block 
(35%), t(19) = 2.65, p < .05. There was no reliable difference in success rate between 
the two different Rule Direction groups, /"(1,19) < 1. Overall, as shown in figure 
16.2a, there is clear evidence of improved performance at the task in this experiment.
To establish that the learning was specific to the hidden contingencies, a second 
analysis was conducted to determine whether the two experimental groups differed in 
their eye-movement patterns. Because trials were terminated upon target discovery, it 
was necessary to perform the statistical tests of saccade-direction frequency only on 
the initial portions of trials. A cut-off of 800 msec was chosen, because very few 
responses were ever generated before this time had elapsed. Only saccades completed 
prior to this time during each trial were considered. The measure used to assess dif­
ferential learning of the directional rules was the frequency of clockwise and of 
counterclockwise saccades per trial. Because the original intent of the experiment was 
to foster screen-relative search patterns, these directions were defined with respect to 
the display itself, for purposes of analysis, rather than in the terms used trigger the 
targets. All saccades with a peak velocity of at least 300 deg/s were checked. If their 
direction at their midpoint was within 45 degrees of being perpendicular to a line 
from the center of the display, then they were categorized as either clockwise or 
counterclockwise.
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One Two Three Four
Trial Block Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Training Rule
Figure 16.2
Results of experiments 1 and 2. Panel A shows the rate of success as a function of trial block for each 
experiment. Panel B depicts directional-saccade frequencies during the fourth block of trials for each 
direction and training condition in the two experiments. Error bars in each graph represent standard errors 
of the mean.
The frequency of such saccades during the final block of trials was subjected to a 
repeated measures ANOVA with Saccade Direction as a within-group factor and 
Rule Direction as a between-group factor. Differential learning would be indicated 
by an interaction between Rule Direction and Saccade Direction. In fact, as illus­
trated in figure 16.2b, this interaction was reliable /’(1,18) = 6.28, p < .05. Overall, 
the frequency of rule-consistent saccades was 0.715 per trial, whereas the frequency 
of oppositely directed saccades (i.e., rule irrelevant) was only 0.518 per trial.
In conclusion, the results of this experiment demonstrate clear evidence of learned 
sensitivity to specific hidden contingencies. Our interviews with participants indicated 
that none of them imagined that target appearance was in any way caused by their 
actions. Their eye-movement patterns nonetheless indicate a learned sensitivity to the 
eye-movement-contingency embedded in the experimental task.
Experiment 2
Saccadic eye-movements are coded in polar coordinates relative to fixation, which 
was why the rule in the first experiment was expressed in terms of eye-centered sac-
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cades. However, it is unclear from Experiment 1 whether a display-relative rule could 
be learned directly. After all, differential learning was demonstrated when display- 
based coordinates were used in the analysis of data. In the present experiment, the 
screen-based rule used for analysis in Experiment 1 was used as the target-triggering 
rule. Apart from the particulars listed below, the methods were the same as in 
Experiment 1.
Methods
Participants. Twenty-two students were divided evenly between the two training 
directions.
Design. Each participant performed visual search in 160 trials. The first 120 trials 
adhered to the training rule. The final 40 trials alternated between the training rule 
and the untrained rule with the intention that direct within-subject comparisons could 
be made for the two different trial types.
Rule for target elicitation. Any large saccade (reaching a velocity of at least 300 
deg/sec over an 8 ms period) was evaluated for its screen-relative direction. If the 
saccade was within 45 deg of being perpendicular to a ray to the center of the display 
when it reached triggering velocity, then it was considered either clockwise or coun­
terclockwise (e.g., an upward saccade on the right side of the screen would be con­
sidered counterclockwise). The rules of target placement were otherwise identical to 
those of the previous experiment.
Assessment of awareness. In addition to questions concerning strategies used, all 
participants were asked to guess what the underlying rule was after we revealed that a 
rule had been in operation. They were then told that the rule hinged on either clock­
wise or counterclockwise eye motions and asked to indicate which direction they had 
been trained with. Three participants in the clockwise search conditions described 
strategies of sweeping around the screen prior to being informed of the rule. All three 
had been in the clockwise rule condition and correctly indicated this. Data from these 
students will be left out of the main analysis (Two of them were the two most suc­
cessful at the task overall.) When asked to guess what the rule might have been four 
more of the participants came up with hypotheses that were correlated with the 
actual search rule. Three of these four students chose the correct rule direction. Of the 
remaining 15 participants, only 6 chose the correct direction.
Results and Discussion
Because of the modified design, the division of the first 120 training trials into 
experimental blocks was modified such that the fourth block contained only 50 trials.
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The other three blocks of ten, twenty and forty trials were defined as before. Sur­
prisingly, there was no evidence that students in this experiment improved. The data 
from these blocks are shown with the data from Experiment 1 in figure 16.2a. In a 
repeated measures ANOVA with Trial Block as a within-group variable and Rule 
Direction as a between-group variable, there was no main effect of Trial Block, 
F(3,51) < 1. Indeed, when search success on the final forty trials was analyzed with 
Trial Rule (new or old rule) as a within-group variable, no reliable difference in per­
formance was found, F(l, 17) < 1, n.s. Moreover, analysis of saccades in the final 
block of learning trials revealed no evidence of an interaction between Training 
Direction and Saccade Direction, F(l, 17) = 1.3, n.s., though there was a nonreliable 
trend for all participants to produce more clockwise saccades, F(l, 17) = 3.46,
p = .08.
To confirm that the results of Experiment 2 differed from those of Experiment 1, 
data from both experiments were analyzed together in a repeated measures ANOVA 
with Rule Type (Eye-centric or Display-based) and Rule Direction as between-group 
variables and Trial Block as a within-group variable. As expected, the effect of trial 
Block differed reliably as a function of Rule Type, F(3,108) = 3.41, p < .05. The 
simplest interpretation of these results is that implicit learning did not occur in 
Experiment 2, whereas it clearly did in Experiment 1.
On the other hand, seven of the 22 students in this experiment were able to artic­
ulate explicit strategies that were correlated with the actual rule, compared with only 
one out of 20 in Experiment 1, = 7.68, p < .01. Apparently, the rule was not
intrinsically more difficult to learn, though it evidently was not learned by any 
implicit mechanisms. Indeed, it is a more easily articulated rule, readily available to 
explicit awareness.
General Discussion
It would appear that, in this novel paradigm, eye-movement control systems can 
learn a rule which is expressed in terms of eye-centric coordinates more easily than a 
rule expressed in terms of display-centered coordinates. Conversely, explicit aware­
ness of successful strategies were more likely to occur when the rule was expressed 
in display-based coordinates. This dissociation is consistent with the idea that the 
implicit learning demonstrated here is localized in levels of the eye-movement control 
system that retain locally expressed coordinate structures and are insensitive to scene 
layout. The formation of explicit rules, on the other hand, probably occurs at level 
where local coordinates have been displaced by world coordinates.
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Previous examples of dissociations between implicit learning and explicit aware­
ness include Berry and Broadbent’s (1984) classic sugar production experiment. In 
their study with a hidden rule, explicit instruction failed to improve task perfor­
mance, though implicit understanding developed in the uninstructed. In that experi­
ment, the task is presented as a problem to be solved. An important difference 
between the sugar production task and this one is that participants in the visual 
search task are unaware that there is even a rule to be learned. From their conscious 
perspective the ostensible task is transparent in Experiment 1. Although the training 
rules differed for the two experiments, the same display-relative rule was used to in­
terpret both sets of eye-movement data. It seems therefore all the more surprising 
that the very same dependent measure of the rule can turn up such different results. If 
the first rule can be implicitly learned, and the second rule would have been satisfied 
more frequently by satisfaction of the first rule, why didn’t the participants in Experi­
ment 2 simply develop the same implicit strategy as those in Experiment 1? It is 
possible that intervening rule steps needed to be learned, but it is also possible that 
the consciously available structure of the task (absence of targets in the middle) 
somehow interfered with the implicit learning process.
Several participants in Experiment 2 commented that the target never appeared in 
the middle of the display (a consequence of the display-based rule definition). Perhaps 
the rotary search strategy they consciously adopted (or which occurred to them even 
if they did not implement it successfully) was a response to this salient feature of the 
search environment.
These experiments were intended to study implicit learning in eye-movement con­
trol systems that might facilitate the acquisition of visual information. Although the 
conclusions reached here are tentative, rules based on eye-centered coordinate frames 
were more susceptible to implicit learning than were display-centered rules. Further 
research is needed to determine whether this finding is an artifactual result of salient 
differences between the search tasks, or whether it indeed signals an important limi­
tation on implicit learning in eye-movement control systems.
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